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ABSTRACT 
The purposes of this paper are two. Firstly, a review is undertaken 
of the available literature 011 the impact of price and exchange rate policies 
on agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, an empirical analysis is 
undertaken using data for 31 Sub-Saharan African countries to test several of 
the common hypotheses concerning this policy Impact. 
The findings tend to confirm the predominate view that in Sub-
Saharan Africa, price and exchange rate policy has an impact on agricultural 
production. With the exception of a few countries, the impact has been 
negative. However, the analysis suggests that these policies are not the most 
important factors affecting agricultural growth. Indeed these policies have a 
relatively small impact compared to other factors such as Government 
j—. p,.™ cnprijr, ntinn orowfh. and Govarnment1s abi.litv 
to operate and maintain its agricultural investments. Much of the variation 
in agricultural growth between African countries still cannot be explained. 
"Appropriate" price and exchange rate policy would have a relatively small 
impact on agricultural growth. The literature on this subject tends to 
suggest a general thrust of policy reform appropriate to all African 
countries. In this article it is argued that there is no stereotype price 
policy package suitable for all African countries. The reason is that the 
depth of the policy problem differs considerably between countries, as do 
policy objectives and other constraints (land, water, markets, social, 
political, etc). The policy package to remedy problems caused by poor price 
and exchange rate policy must therefore be adapted to each country. It should 
in particular adapt itself to the political situations of various countries. 
It must emphasize policies in addition to price and exchange rate reform. 
Donors should help by pushing reform in the right direction, but not expecting 
rapid achievement of optimal policy. Helping to establish an effective policy 
making process may be more important than achieving specific price and 
exchange rate targets.. 
IDS/DP 279 
THE IMPACT OF PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES 
ON AGRICULTURE IN SUB—5AHARAN AFRICA 
Table of Contents 
Page No 
I INTRODUCTION, THE PROBLEM IN ITS CENTEXT 1 
II TYPES OF PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES 2 
III ANALYSIS OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE POLICY 4 
A. The Issue 4 
B. Low Retail Food Prices, High Farmer 
Producer Prices 4 
C. Low Retail Food Price, Low Farmer 
Producer Prices 5 
D. Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Low 
Farm Prices on Agricultural Growth 7 
E. Summary 16 
IV EXCHANGE RATE POLICY: 17 
A. The Problem 17 
B. An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of 
Exchange Rate Over-Valuation on 
Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 18 
C. The Argument for Intentionally 
Discriminating against Agriculture 20 
V TOWARD AN APPROPRIATE PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE 
POLICY 24 
A. Summary of the Impact of Typical Price 
and Exchange Rate Policy 24 
B. The Appropriate Policy Reform 25 
C. The Conventional Wisdom regarding the 
Impact of the Proposed Reform 26 
D. The Critique and a Recommendation 27 
ANNEX I - Methodology for Measuring Reference 
Prices, Policy Distortions, and Com-
parative Advantage 
A. Measuring Reference Prices 
B« Measuring Policy Distortions 
C. Measuring Comparative Ad-
vantage 
ANNEX II - Tables 
ANNEX III - References 
IDS/DP 279 
THE IMPACT OF PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES 
ON AGRICULTURE IN SUB—5AHARAN AFRICA 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM IN ITS CONTEXT 
1. In analyzing policy the performance of agriculture in Sub-Saharan 
Agriculture must be born in mind- Firstly, agriculture is important in 
Sub-Saharan Africa contributing from 20 to 60 percent of GDP depending on the 
country, an average of 80% of employment, and 50 to 90 percent of exports. 
Much industry, trade, etc depends on agriculture. There is variation, but 
agriculture is clearly important. 1/ 
2. Food production in Sub-Saharan Africa grew by about 1.5% p.a. in the 
1970's (up to 1979) compared to about 2.0% p.a. in the 1960's. Population 
growth was at 2.5% p.a. in the '70's. In 1979-82 food production grew faster 
in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1.9% p.a. But population growth continued at 2.5% 
p.a. There has therefore been a continued decline of food production per 
capita. This is the food crisis. 
3. There is variation In this picture. 12 of the 40 major countries of 
Sub-Sahdran Africa raised per capita food production over the period 1979-82 
(Malawi, Rwanda, Niger, Ethiopia are examples). Performance has therefore 
varied. 
4. Food Imports have risen very fast in Sub-Saharan Africa. One out of 
5 inhabitants in Sub-Saharan Africa are now fed from Imported food. The value 
of food imports averaged $6.8 billion in 1980-82. Per capita imports are 
increasing. In 1970-72, 12.8 kg of commercial cereals per capita were 
imported into Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1980-82, this figure reached 
23.7 kg. 2/ In addition, food aid has been increasing. 
5. Agricultural exports increased at 1.9% p.a. in the 1960's (in real 
terms), but declined slightly in volume and value terms in the 1970's. 
Agricultural exports increased at 1% p.a. average between '79-82 (but still a 
decline In per capita terms). There has been a continued decline in 
Sub-Saharan Africa's share in world agricultural exports. The export 
performance in 1979-82 was uneven between agricultural commodities: 
(i) rapid increase In exports of cocoa, sugar, tobacco, sorghum; 
(li) stagnation: coffee and tea; 
(iil) decline: cotton, sisal, rubber; 
(iv) rapid decline: oilseeds, bananas. 
1/ 
2/ 
World Bank data. 
Ibid 
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6. The literature reviewd for this article (Annex III) overwhelmingly 
suggests that a ma.jor cause of the poor performance described above is the 
poor price and exchange rate policies almost universally applied in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. This article will support the view that such policies 
have had a generally negative impact on agricultural performance. However, it 
is found that there is considerable variation between African countries. Many 
maintain price and exchange rate policies which are roughly appropriate. In 
addition, the research done for this article suggests that such policies are 
not the most important factors explaining agricultural performance in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Other factors are far more important. There remains a 
great deal that we do not know: we cannot fully explain the variation in 
agricultural growth between A.frican countries. This article finds that the 
price policy remedies suggested in the literature are too stereotyped. The 
adaptation of appropriate policy to different country circumstances is not a 
simple task. Political, social, environmental, and economic constraints 
differ between countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Policy should therefore 
differ from country to country as a function of these constraints. 
7. A more sophisticated and in-depth analysis of the same issues studied 
here will begin during 1984 under the leadership of Ms Uraa Lele of the World 
Bank. It will be of interest to compare the results of the in-depth country 
analysis with this cross-country analysis. 
II. TYPES OF PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES 
8. The policies considered here are broad, involving hundreds of 
Government decisions and Instruments. There is however a predominant policy 
package found in many African countries which is the object of considerable 
criticism in much of the academic literature and by the aid donors. There are 
variations, and some countries have significantly different policies. 
However, in general the package includes the following: 
(a) Official retail food prices for certain staples are typically 
artificially low. There are two main variants: 
(i) low official prices paid to farmers by parastatala 
or marketing boards. The parastatals or marketing boards 
add their cost and sell to the consumer at a low 
price. The burden is on the farmer; or 
(ii) relatively high price paid to the farmer by the 
parastatals, while the parastatal sells more cheaply 
to the consumer. The parastatals are financially 
supported by Government (in this case Government 
subsidizes the consumer), or by recourse to the banking 
system (in which case whoever finances the banking system 
subsidizes the consumer). 
Parastatals may also import foodstuffs and sell at a loss, or 
transfer food aid to consumers at less than Its commercial value. 
- 3 -
IDS/DP 279 
(b) Pan-territorial pricing is commonly applied in which 
farmgate prices are fixed at the same level everywhere in 
the country and throughout the year. Wholesale and retail 
food prices may also be separately fixed at the same level 
everywhere in the country and throughout the year. 
(c) Often there is an uncontrolled parallel market for food. 
This is usually discouraged by Government and sometimes 
actively so. In other cases Governments are indifferent to 
its existence. The parallel market (or free market) is 
rarely assisted by Government. Where it exists prices are 
relatively free, though influenced by prices paid by 
competing parastatals. 
(d) The exchange rate is often overvalued. This policy is 
often combined with import quotas and duties which protect 
manufactured goods produced locally against import 
competition (the exception is in the franc zone where the 
CPA franc is not now significantly overvalued). Exchange 
rates are however periodically adjusted by Government. A 
country's exchange rate is also adjusted as other foreign 
currencies move, relative to that to which the local 
currency is pegged, or when domestic price inflation 
differs from price inflation in countries which are trading 
partners. 
(e) Farm Inputs are typically subsidized (low interest rate on 
credit, subsidized fertilizers, subsidized irrigation water 
and high yielding variety seed, free livestock health 
services, Government supported extension and research). 
(f) There is often a tax on agricultural exports. This is 
often combined with fixed official prices paid to producers 
of agricultural exports designed to stabilize the domestic 
price compared to the more volatile international price. 
The price paid to the fanner will be below or above the 
international price depending mostly on the movement of the 
latter in its cycle and the efficiency of the parastatal 
enterprise or marketing board acting as an intermediary. 
(g) Land taxes are generally not used in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
(h) Formal income tax is almost always avoided by farmers or 
not applied to farmers. In some countries a poll tax is 
applied. It Is to be noted that the implicit tax on 
farmers caused by the above exchange rate and price policy 
often amounts to an income tax, to the extent that farmers 
have no alternative free market on which to sell. 
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III. THE IMPACT OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE POLICY 
A. The Issue 
9. Why are retail food prices often set artificially low by 
Governments? One objective sought in fixing low retail prices for 
food staples is to provide food to the poor at a price they can 
afford in order to assist them in meeting minimum nutritional 
needs. Another is that the urban population (who are often not the 
poor) which benefits most if not entirely from low food prices is 
often a source of potential social/political instability, and a 
source of support to political leaders. Assuring low prices for 
staples is therefore seen by many Governments as one instrument 
among many for maintaining social and political stability. 1/ A 
third objective is to reduce price inflation. All three objectives 
are legitimate. The question Is what is the cost, and are there 
cheaper ways to attain the same objectives? 
B. Low Retail Food Prices, High Farm Producer Prices 
10. Some Governments have attempted to maintain both low retail 
food prices and high farm producer prices. This is done through 
parastatal enterprises which buy crops at high prices and sell to 
consumers (or retailers) at low prices. Parastatal financial losses 
are subsidized by Government. The benefit of this strategy is that 
low retail food prices are maintained without penalizing farmers. 
The cost of this policy involves the often enormous financial 
transfer from Government to parastatals which is required to 
maintain the low prices. The result is that Government has less to 
invest and to operate existing investments. In Tanzania for 
example, the financial losses of agricultural parastatals in 1980/81 
amounted to twice the recurrent budget for agriculture. In Upper 
Volta, such subsidies amounted to 20% of agriculture's recurrent 
budget (1979). In Cameroon, subsidies to the cotton parastatal 
alone amounted to 20-30% of agriculture's recurrent budget. In 
Zambia, subsidies to agricultural parastatals (of which there are 
47) are several times the Ministry of Agriculture's current budget.2/ 
11. A second cost of the low retail food price policy has 
involved the substitution in consumer diets of subsidized foods for 
non-subsidized foods. Often, subsidized wheat and maize flour and 
rice is substituted for unsubsidized cassava, millet and sorghum. 
Where the latter is cheaper to produce, this "crowding-out" effect 
has an economic cost. Wheat, rice, and maize must often be imported. 
1/ A more blatantly political motivation is argued convincingly by 
Robert Bates in Markets and States in Tropical Africa, the Political 
Basis of Agricultural Policies, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1981. Mr Bates' arguments will be returned to in the last 
chapter of this paper. 
2/ Source 43. Source number refers to references listed in 
Annex III. 
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Producers suffer because the market for cassava, millet arid' sorghum 
shrinks. There is a counter-argument which asserts that changes in 
relative consumer prices have little impact on demand for various 
foodstuff. This counter view sees the shift in urban consumption 
from cassava, millet and sorghum to wheat, rice and maize to be the 
result of urbanization, the spread of Western consumption habits, 
and the intrinsically better taste and preparatory characteristics 
of maize, wheat, and rice. It is 
impossible to resolve this debate empirically. However, all 
evidence (such as that to be cited below) suggests that Africans, 
like people on other continents, respond to changes in prices. As 
the price of wheat, maize and/or rice falls relative to cassava, 
millet and sorghum, they will tend to substitute the former for the 
latter in consumption. An interesting example is found in Senegal: 
"There Is a pervasive conventional wisdom to the effect 
that millet is not a substitute for rice for most urban 
consumers. In 1975, however, and subsequent to the 
increase In the consumer price of broken rice from CFAF 60 
to CFAF 100/kg, imports of rice which had previously been 
at about 200,000 tons/year fell to 100,000 tons. The late 
1974 millet harvest of 700,000 tons was by far a new 
record; yet the fragmentary evidence on producer prices 
suggests that millet was traded in the illegal market at 
CFAF 50/kg or more in contrast to the official price of 
CFAF 35/lcg. All available indication point to a 
considerable switch in demand from rice to millet, 
sufficient to challenge the conventional wisdom of very 
imperfect substitutability between the two commodities and 
to illustrate the power of relative price policy." 1/ 
Here was a case of the rice subsidy being diminished, and urban 
consumers quickly responding by consuming less rice and more 
domestically produced millet. 
C. Low Retail Food Prices, Low Farmer Producer Prices 
12. A second method of maintaining low retail prices for 
staples is to pay artificially low prices to farmers. All empirical 
analysis reviewed for this paper indicates that farmers are 
responsive to changes in input and output prices facing them. 
Studies show supply elasticities of individual cash crops (percent 
change in output in response to a one percent change in real prices) 
of .1 to .8 in the short term, .2 to 1.2 in the long term. 2/ 
1/ Source Number 43. 
2/ See source number 37, page 29 for summary of a large number 
of these studies. See also source numbers 3, 17, 20, 21, 24, 32, 33 
and 44. Finally, Marian Bond summarizes the results of many 
agricultural price response studies in "Agricultural Responses to 
Prices in Sub-Saharan African Countries", IMF Staff Papers, Vol 30, 
no 4, December 1983. 
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Supply elasticities will vary by crop, by farmer circumstance and 
other factors. As an example the lowest supply elasticities by 
commodity quoted in an article by Ms Marian Bond, "Agricultural 
Responses to Prices in Sub-Saharan African Countries", IMF Staff 
Papers, are as follows: 
Crop Country Short-Run Long-Run 
Elasticity Elasticity 
Cocoa Ghana .39 .77 
Coffee Africa .12 .44 
Cotton Uganda .25 .25 
Groundnuts Nigeria .24 .24 
Palm Kernals Nigeria .22 .22 
Palm Oil Nigeria .29 .29 
Rubber Liberia .14 .22 
Sisal Tanzania .06 .48 
Tobacco Malawi .48 .48 
13. The above results suggest for example that on average, a 1% 
increase in the real price of cocoa paid to Ghanaian farmers 
increases production by .39% in the short term, .77% in the long 
term. A reduction in price reduces production by as much. This 
reduction occurs because with a lower price, farmers switch land, 
labor, and inputs into other crops. 
14. Evidence that farmers respond to changing commodity prices 
by producing more or less of individual crops tells us little about 
the elasticity of aggregate agricultural production. If for 
example, coffee prices in Kenya decline relative to maize prices, 
coffee production is likely to decline, and maize production to 
increase. But if all crop prices were increased simultaneously, 
would aggregate production Increase? Most of the literature on this 
subject either states or implies that the answer to this question is 
yes. But the basis of this assertion is usually the empirical 
evidence on individual commodity responsiveness to price such as 
that presented above. This evidence is inadequate. 
15. The intuitive arguments for the assertion that aggregate 
agricultural production is responsive to aggregate relative 
agricultural price levels, are compelling. They run as follows. 
The greater the importance in farm output of the products for which 
official prices are set artificially low, the greater the tendency 
for farmers to return to subsistence farming, to smuggle crops to 
neighbouring countries where controls are less rigorous or where 
prices are higher, and/or to leave the land for the city in the 
pursuit of relatively higher income. The result is a decline in 
aggregate production. Conversely, where prices are high on 
aggregate, farmers will be drawn into the cash economy, will in-
tensify production, and will be less attracted to incomes available 
in the city. This will have a positive impact on aggregate 
production. An extreme example is that of Tanzania where official 
farmgate prices are quite depressed and all of the above responses 
are documented. 1/ 
1/ Sources 23 and 43. 
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The argument continues that the immediate production decline in 
response to low official farmgate prices is exacerbated in the 
longer-term because farmers have less income from which to save and 
Invest in agriculture. In addition, low prices and the resulting 
lower farm income serves to reduce farmer credit-worthiness making 
it more difficult to obtain credit, farm inputs and equipment. 
Investment: In agriculture declines. Hence the long term aggregate 
production response to variations in aggregate farmgate prices will 
be more pronounced than in the short run. 
D. Empirical Analysis of the Aggregate Impact of Low Farm 
Prices on Agricultural Growth 
16. The above intuitive arguments have rarely been tested, 
because they are difficult'to analize statistically. An aggregate 
supply response cannot be obtained by merely adding or averaging 
individual commodity supply responses. In addition, if prices for 
cash crops are increased on aggregate, cash crop production may 
increase at the expense of production of subsistence crops. 
Subsistence crop production is often not measured. For these 
reasons, using time series aggregate cash crop production data for a 
single country, and relating it to an agricultural producer price 
index, does not provide reliable results. Nevertheless, there have 
been attempts to do this, the most notable of which was done by Ms 
Marian Bond (reference above). Using FAO data for nine African 
countries she obtains an average price elasticity of agricultural 
production equal to .12. This is much lower than that obtained for 
individual crops. She also finds that "the average long run price 
elasticity for nine countries that were examined is only slightly 
larger than their average short run elasticities." This significant 
finding is explored below. 
17. The methodology used for the present article in measuring 
agricultural production response to price policy is quite different 
from that used by Ms Bond. It attempts to get around the problems 
of using single country time series data in relating production 
changes to price changes. 
18. The method required firstly the determination of the degree 
of price discrimination against farmers in a sample of 31 
Sub-Saharan African countries. This was measured by comparing 
farmgate prices with import and export parity prices adjusted to the 
farmgate. This measurement is known as the nominal protection 
coefficient. The methodology is described in Annexes I and II. 
Average farm level nominal protection coefficients are given for the 
31 country sample In Annex II. 1/ The data base was derived from 
virtually every World Bank Agricultural Sector Survey undertaken in 
the last 5 years In Sub-Saharan Africa, and other documents. A 
total of 37 documents were used. For the reasons discussed in Annex 
II, the number representing the average relationship between 
1/ Sources: World Bank Reports: reference numbers 42 and 44 
for agricultural growth rates; World Bank Agricultural Sector 
Surveys, Country Economic Reports and other literature from which 
distortion level and relative prices were assessed (Sources: 1, 14, 
22, 23, 29, 43, 44, 45). 
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farmgate and import or export parity prices Js subject to a large 
margin of er^or. Data covered a large number of commodities and 
several years in the 1970-1981 period in each country. The data 
does represent the best that could be found by a large number of 
World Bank missions and independent researchers. It probably 
represents the best source of rvci data available. Using these data 
the categorization of countries into those with low, medium and high 
levels of price discrimination against farmers was possible. 1/ 
The term "price discrimination" is used rather than price distortion 
because no country in the sample has average levels of farmgate 
prices above the import or export parity price. Hence the price 
distortion is in one direction only, in which there is some 
discrimination against agriculture. At best there is parity between 
farmgate prices and world prices appropriately adjusted. 2/ 
19. The following tables provide data for 31 Sub-Saharan 
African countries relating agricultural growth rates (1970-1981) to 
average degree of agricultural producer price discrimination. The 
countries are divided into three groups, characterized by low, 
medium and high farm level price discrimination. 
1/ High discrimination is arbitrarily judged to exist where 
farmgate prices are more than 40% below import or export parity 
prices on average. Low discrimination occurs if farmgate prices are 
not more than 15% below import parity. Medium discrimination occurs 
in between. High, medium ar..d low discrimination is thus a relative 
concept. 
2/ There is evidence of improvement in the situation in some 
African countries. Messrs D Ghai and I. Smith in a study entitled 
"Food Policy and Equity in Sub-Saharan Africa" found that for some 
food commodities in some African countries, producer prices have 
been, increasing fa ster than world prices. This was hypothesized to 
result from increasing demand for food relative to supply, putting 
upward pressure on producer prices. For exported commodities the 
situation as reported by Ghai and Smith is not: improving. A summary 
of their results is as follows: 
Domes tic pro;1u eer price increasing significantly faster 
than'World Price (1969-1' 
Number of Countries out of Sample Number 
Maize 15 of ~ 23 
Wheat 3 of 12 
Rice 7 of 22 
Groundnuts 6 of 17 
Cocoa 2 of 10 
Coffee 1 (,f 15 
Seed Cotton 3 of 18 
Source : D'naran Ghai and Lawrence Smith, "Food Policy and Equity in 
Sub-Saharan Africa", World Employment Research Program, T.LO, Geneva, 
August 1933. 
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Countries with Low or No Farm Average Growth Rate of Agricul-
Price Discrimination tural Production(197Q-81) (% p.a.) 
Chad 0.7 
Malawi 4.1 
Upper Volta 1.4 
Rwanda 3.0 
Somalia -0.6 
Central African Rep. 2.3 
Kenya 4.2 
Lesotho 4.3 
Zimbabwe -0.5 
Cameroon 3.9 
Botswana 8.5 
Congo 2.1 
Ivory Coast 4.7 
Average 2.9 
Countries with Medium Farm 
Price Discrimination 
Mali 4.0 
Burundi 2.2 
Niger -3.0 
Sudan 2.3 
Senegal 2.6 
Liberia 5.0 
Zamiba 1.8 
Nigeria -0.4 
Average 1.8 
Countries with High Farm • 
Price Discrimination 
Zaire 1.5 
Ethiopia .9 
Uganda -.8 
Tanzania 3.3 
Guinea -0.7 
Benin 0.0 
Sierra Leone 2.4 
Madagascar .3 
Togo 1.5 
Ghana 0.0 
Average .8 
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20. Scrutiny of this table shows two notable characteristics. 
Firstly there has been extraordinary variation in agricultural 
growth performance.. Secondly there is great variation between 
African countries in the degree to which policy discriminates 
against farm producer prices. The "typical" price policy scenario 
described in para 8 has characterized the countries having high farm 
price discrimination,and to a lesser extent the countries with 
medium farm price discrimination. Low discrimination countries have 
had fewer of these characteristics although even in these countries 
some farm price distortions exist. 
21. Secondly, the data shows African countries with low farm 
producer price discrimination to have averaged 2.9% p.a. 
agricultural growth during 1970-81. Those with medium 
discrimination averaged 1.8% p.a. agricultural growth. Those with 
high discrimination averaged .8% p.a. growth. The difference 
between these three categories would be even more marked if the 
three of the low price discrimination countries having low 
agricultural growth (Zimbabwe, Somalia and Chad) were excluded. Low 
growth in these three cases is associated with prolonged and 
distructive war which of course destroys all chance of growth even 
in the best of price policy environments. 
22. The above analysis was explored further using statistical 
regression techniques. The methodology was to regress the 
agricultural growth rates for the 31 countries on the nominal 
protection coefficient (which is equal to the average ratio of 
farmgate prices to world prices adjusted to the farmgate). The 
lower the nominal protection coefficient, the higher the 
discrimination against agriculture. However, in no country was the 
coefficient greater than 1 (which represents parity between farmgate 
and world prices). Thus, the results are relevant for situations of 
some discrimination against agriculture. Data is shown In Annex 
II. The regression result was as follows: 
(Agricultural = -1.7 + .05 (Nominal Protection Coeffi-
Growth Rate) cient. measured from 1 to 100%) 
T statistic = (1.0) (2.4) 
R2= .13 F(l,29) = 5.58 
A T statistic equal to 2.4 is significant at the 99% 
probability level for 29 degrees of freedom. A 1% increase in the 
net protection coefficient (i.e. a reduction of price discrimination 
at farm producer level) is associated with a .05% increase in the 
agricultural growth rate. The price elasticity of agricultural 
growth implied by this equation is significantly greater than zero, 
but is quite low. In addition, the correlation coefficient is 
extremely low, suggesting that only 13% of the variation in 
- 11 -
IDS/DP 279 
agricultural growth rates is explainable by the nominal protection 
coefficient. Other factors are of greater importance in explaining 
variation in agricultural growth. 1/ 
23. Additional factors likely to affect agricultural growth 
were investigated statistically. These include: 
(a) average fertilizer use per ha, (the greater the 
fertilizer use the greater is agricultural growth 
hypothesized to be); 
(b) movement in terms of trade between a countries' exports 
and its imports (declining export prices relative to import 
prices suppress growth). This movement has been 
unfavorable. Oil price jumps In 1973/74 and in 1979 
increased the oil bill. Primary product price declines 
also occurrcd during these periods. This situation has 
steadily worsened. Through 1983 there was a serious 
decline in export prices relative to import prices for all 
African countries except oil exporters. 2] Since exports 
tend to be agricultural it means that relative changes in 
International prices are generally hurting African 
farmers. In addition, worsening terms of trade puts 
pressure on balance of payments. Such pressure usually has 
served to cause Governments to tighten the import regime. 
Often this meant among other things less access by farmers 
to imported farm inputs. 
(c) Population growth (the greater the population growth 
the greater is agricultural growth, though per capita 
agricultural growth may be slower); 
(d) degree of concentration of exports in a limited number 
of commodities (the greater the concentration the greater 
the vulnerability to swings In foreign markets); 
(e) adult literacy (the more literate the population, the 
more amenable is that population to technical advance in 
agriculture); 
1/ Some unknown amount of the unexplained variation in agricultural 
growth rates is explained by data error. This problem is common in 
all empirical work on African agriculture, and is the source of much 
of the controversy over results obtained in various studies. The 
defense of the data used here is that it represents the reflection 
of a large number of economists studying agriculture in a large 
number of African countries. Since the data is taken from World 
Bank Agricultural Sector Reports it has in principle been subjected 
to considerable scrutiny and review. 
2/ World Bank data. 
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(f) the share of public consumption in GDP (the greater is 
Government "consumption" (recurrent expenditures) the less 
remains for investment and the lower is agricultural 
growth); and 
(g) the degree of intervention of Government in farm input 
supply (the greater the intervention the lower the growth). 
24. The statistical tests incorporating the above factors did 
improve the statistical explanation of the cause of agricultural 
growth. Factors not important according to the data used (no 
statistically significant relationship with agricultural growth) 
include fertilizer use, adult literacy, terras of trade, and export 
concentration. In order of importance in explaining agricultural 
growth are: 
1. the degree of private and mixed control 
of farm input supply; 
2. population growth; 
3. the share of Government consumption 
(recurrent expenditure) in GDP (the 
greater the share the greater the 
agricultural growth); 
4. the level of farm price discrimination. 
25. 
Agricul-
tural 
Growth 
The equation is: 
"-3.9+.02 Nominal 
protec-
tion co-
effici-
ent 
-1.2 Degree of 
public 
involve-
ment in 
farm in-
put supply 
+ .15 Percent 
of Go-
vernment 
current 
expend. 
in GDP 
+ .74 Popu-
lation 
growth 
T statistic = (1.7)(1.2) (1.6) (2.4) (1.3) 
R2 = .31 F(4,26) =4.5 
All variables are significant according to the T statistic at the 
85% probability level or above. See Annex 2 for data. The degree 
of public involvement in farm input supply is measured as a dummy 
variable, with high involvement represented as a 1, low as 0. 
26 Price distortions are important as a determinant of 
agricultural growth, but not preponderate. The most important 
factor among those tested appears to be the degree to which the 
public sector involves itself in farm input supply. The greater 
such involvement, the lower is agricultural • growth. Countries which 
leave farm input supply to private and mixed ownership, enterprises 
tend to have higher rates of agricultural growth. 1/ 
1/ This is a different area of research to that pursued here. 
Analysis which tends to support this finding may be found in sources 
38, 43 and 44. 
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Consistent with findings from other studies, the higher the rate of 
population growth, the higher the rate of agricultural growth, This 
is explainable by the fact that in near subsistence and smallholder 
agriculture, labor is the most important factor of production. 
Higher population growth furnishes labor at an increased rate, 
•stimulating agriculture. 1/ The third most important factor is-the 
share of Government's recurrent expenditure to GDP, which is 
positively related to agricultural growth. The direction of 
causality of this variable is difficult to determine. There is some 
evidence to suggest that in Africa, Government recurrent budgets 
inadequate to operate and maintain investments- inhibit agricultural 
growth. 2/ Governments which allocate more to operation and 
maintenance may indeed obtain better performance from agricultural 
investments, and hence more growth. On the other hand, it may be 
that more rapid agricultural growth finances more rapid growth of 
Government consumption. In this case the direction of causality is 
opposite to that described above. Finally, the lower the effective 
taxation of agriculture through price policy (i.e the higher the 
nominal protection coefficient), the higher the agricultural 
growth. However, the coefficient is lower (the elasticity is .02%), 
than was the case when nl) other variables are represented in the 
equation. 
27. Despite the above enlargement of the explanation of 
agricultural growth, the four factors listed above "explain" only 
30% of the variation between countries in agricultural growth. 
Seventy percent of the variation is still unexplained. The 
literature was searched for other possible explanatory factors. 
Many were found, but are difficult to quantify. These are discussed 
below. 
28. General economic deterioration in Africa was probably a 
factor causing agricultural deterioration. There is a close 
correlation between economic growth and agricultural growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, but the direction of causality is difficult to 
determine. Agriculture i^ partly dependent on imported inputs: 
fertilizers, pesticides, equipment. Balance of payments crises have 
caused reduced imports of inputs and equipment, perhaps causing a 
reduction in agricultural production. 
1_/ It also stimulates consumption, which creates problems 
particularly if the consumption stimulus exceeds the production 
stimulus. 
2/ Most World Bank agricultural sector reports record 
situations in which largely donor financed agricultural and rural 
investments are not maintained for lack of Government resources, 
inhibiting agricultural growth. The severity of this situation 
varies considerably between countries. This variable may measure 
the impact of variations in this situation. 
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29. Food aid nay have a negative Impact on production. 
Firstly, if food is in short supply, this would normally stimulate 
increases in producer prices, stimulating subsequent production. 
Food aid dampens price increases and hence probably dampens 
production increases. Since most food aid comes in the form of 
wheat and rice, it has probably also contributed to shifting 
consumer tastes to such commodities and away from commodities more 
easily and more widely produced in Africa (millet, sorghum, cassava, 
pulses). However, this explanation would normally have been 
captured in the measurement of nominal protection (food aid reduces 
nominal protection of agriculture). As we have seen, this explains 
little of the variation in agricultural growth. 
30. Many argue that there is a poor resource base In Africa for 
agricultural production. The data related to this question are 
poor. FAO data suggest that: 
45% of .Africa is poorly endowed for agricultural production 
20% of Africa is moderately endowed; 
35% is well endowed. 
However, countries such as South Korea are poorly endowed, yet have 
shown rapid agricultural growth. It is not clear in the literature 
how much importance this factor has had; and it was not possible to 
capture the impact of this variable statistically. 
31. There is a common argument that agricultural growth in 
Africa is inhibited by its low level of agricultural services: 
agricultural research and extension, input supply, credit and. 
marketing, etc. The argument is that such services are essential 
for agriculture to flourish, as seen by the experience of developed 
countries. In reflecting on this it is interesting that the limited 
output expansion which has occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
largely the result of expansion in areas under cultivation: not in 
amounts produced per unit area (yields). Yields have been largely 
stagnant '(although crop yields increased by 2% p.a. in the 1960's). 
There are exceptions such as the hybrid maize experience in Kenya. 
However, research, extension and the use of modern inputs have not 
generally permitted more to be obtained per unit area since the 
1960's. The problem with dependency on expansion of cultivated area 
is that arable land is increasingly unavailable (there are notable 
exceptions such as Zaire and Zambia). More cultivation of marginal 
areas is causing soil erosion and desertification in many African 
countries. The problem is that agricultural research is not coming 
up with many new agricultural technologies, and extension services 
are not extending the few technologies available. The adequacy of 
services proved impossible to differentiate1 adequately between 
African coutries; and could not therefore be included in the 
equation. However, it appears plausible that this factor explains 
some of the 70% of the variation in agricultural growth not 
explained by the equation. 
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32. Another problem often mentioned is poor donor advice to 
African governments. Donor aid provides about 55% of African 
investment. The comparable figure in Asia is 14%. Donors are 
important in Africa. Unfortunately, most have their own ideas about 
African agriculture, and these ideas have varied considerably from 
one donor to the next. Some donors insist on more private sector 
oriented policy and investment. Some support parastatals, others 
cooperatives and others the Government Administration. The 
resulting "noise" may be difficult for most African governments to 
sort through. Actual government practice often combines most of 
this advice, depending on the particular project. Again this 
variable is impossible to quantify. 
33. The "parastatal" problem is often hypothesized to have 
hindered growth in agriculture. This has been partially tested 
statistically above in showing that heavy Government involvement in 
farm input supply is associated with lower agricultural growth. 
This involvement, along with Government involvement in agricultural 
marketing and processing, is often undertaken through parastatal 
enterprises. These have proved inefficient with remarkable 
regularity. Parastatals tend to be managed on the same principles 
as the Civil Service, leading to lack of entrepreneurship due to 
poor management and in flexibility, a tendency to over-man, 
escalating costs and poor service. The lesson has been that it is 
difficult to adapt bureaucratic procedures to commercially oriented 
operations. The financial losses of parastatals have also in effect 
transferred resources from possible investments and operations 
benefitting agriculture, to simple maintenance of the parastatal 
inefficiencies. 
Political interference in parastatal operations is frequent. 1/ 
Often private marketing agents could be (or are) more competitive 
and efficient than parastatals. Private traders have an 
economically close relationship with farmers. Skill requirements in 
managing typically small private enterprises are lower than those 
for parastatals. When private traders are harassed or banned, a 
negative impact on product marketing usually results. In extreme 
cases where the private marketing network is destroyed and the 
public marketing parastatals are very inefficient, agriculture tends 
to revert back to subsistence (as in Tanzania). 
34. Finally there is the problem of politics. The most obvious 
political problems are war and civil strife. The continuing 
political fagility in some Africa countries has induced many 
political leaders to pursue the immediate objective of reducing 
tensions and creating consensus through a series of short term 
measures (such as food subsidies, allocation of political favors to 
particular tribes or elites, etc). Long term objectives (such as a 
price policy which stimulates production) are often delayed. Too 
little in resources may have gone to rural areas in most African 
countries due to the weakness of rural populations in defending 
their interests. 2/ Again, this hypothesis was not tested 
empirically. 
1/ See source 42 for an interesting exposition of this argument. 
2/ This is the thesis of Robert Bates: Source number 10. 
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E. Summary 
35. Fixed reta'il food prices are often low relative to what the 
market would create and relative to world prices. To permit low 
retail prices, either farmer prices are kept low, or parastatal 
enterprises trading these commodities trade at a loss. In the 
second case Government financial resources are used to subsidize the 
parastatals, reducing the amount remaining for development 
expenditure. In the former case, an artificially low farmgate price 
of a particular commodity has a negative impact on the production of 
that commodity. However, the impact on aggregate production of 
keeping many farmgate prices low is considerably less than is 
generally thought. Other factors are much more important in 
determining aggregate agricultural production in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 1/ Nevertheless, avoiding price discrimination against 
agriculture will have some positive impact on aggregate, produc-
tion. 2/ 
1/ Economic research should look more vigourously than it has 
to date at the relative importance of these various factors. 
2/ A different area of argument relates to the policy of 
fixing agricultural producer prices at all (as opposed to the 
argument about fixing them at low levels). A policy of fixed 
agricultural producer prices is often partly intended to stabilize 
farm income. Experience shows that in reality fixed prices 
de-stabilize farm income. When output falls due to low rainfall or 
other production problems, and prices are fixed, farm revenue will 
decline. If prices had been free when output fell, prices would 
have increased. Farm revenue would have declined less. In a market 
where producer prices are free to move in response to supply and 
demand, prices will tend to increase when supply is low, and decline 
when supply is high, thus stabilizing farm income (as long as the 
elasticity of supply is greater than zero, which it is according to 
the empirical studies cited above). The available evidence also 
suggests that the maintenance of the same price throughout the year 
makes it unprofitable for farmers to store crops on the farm, 
encouraging them to sell Immediately after the harvest. This is 
because the farmer does not receive a higher price later in the year 
when supply is not so abundant as at harvest time. There is thus no 
incentive for on-farm storage. Unless the parallel market is 
active, the tendency to sell immediately after the harvest 
over-taxes transport networks and parastatal handling and storage 
capacities since all official sales occur at the same time. Prices 
which are allowed to increase with time would serve to reimburse 
farmers (and middlemen) for storing. This would relieve pressure on 
the transport network and on parastatals marketing firms. 
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IV. EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, AND AGRICULTURAL GROWTH 
A. The Problem 
36.- One possible explanation for variation in agricultural 
growth between African countries was not cited above; and that is 
exchange rate over-valuation. Exchange rate over-valuation is 
common in Africa outside of the franc zone. The IMF's 1982 World 
Economic Outlook reported that "Real effective exchange rates for 
currencies for African countries have on average appreciated over 
the period 1973-81 by 44%" (page 122). Exchange rate over-valuation 
is rarely Intended by Governments. It is most often the result 
firstly of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy directed at 
maximising economic growth. A side effect of expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policy Is price inflation which when more rapid than the 
price inflation of principal trading partners causes real exchange 
rates to appreciate. Secondly exchange rate•over-valuation is often 
a side effect of a strategy to promote industrial growth as a motor 
of development. Governments pursue industrial growth by imposing 
high duties and quotas on imports of industrial goods which compete 
with domestic manufactures. This serves to increase domestic prices 
of industrial goods relative to world prices. In this circumstance, 
the official exchange rate will typically over-value the local 
currency relative to foreign currency, compared to the real 
purchasing power of the local currency (because domestic, prices will 
be higher than foreign prices at the official exchange rate). The 
assertion common in the literature is that this policy has had a 
negative impact on agricultural growth. This assertion will be 
tested here. 
37. Agricultural exports are hypothesized to be curtailed by 
over-valued exchange rates. The exchange rate determines how much 
in local currency is received by the exporter in return for foreign 
currency earnings. If the exchange rate is over-valued, the 
exporter will receive less in local currency for exported produce 
than would otherwise be the case. If the exporter is the farmer 
himself, the farmer's incentive to produce export crops will 
decline, or he may be encouraged to smuggle these crops into a 
neighbouring country. The individual cash crop supply elasticities 
shown in paragraph 12 are relevant here. A change in the exchange 
rate can have a price impact on the producer identical to that of 
changing a crop procurement price. Empirical studies over-
whelmingly show a high response of export crop production to 
variation in price. Typically the response is lower in the first 
year of a price change particularly for tree crops. The response 
increases over time (is lagged). Hence the impact of an over-valued 
exchange rate is the same as the maintenance of artificially low 
retail food prices discussed above. Either producer prices are kept 
artificially low by the over-valued exchange rate, or a parastatal 
(or marketing Board) receives Government financial support to 
maintain adequate producer prices (or what amounts to the same 
thing: agricultural exports can be directly subsidized by Government 
to compensate for the implicit tax of exchange rate over-valuation). 
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38. A second negative effect of an overvalued exchange rate on 
agriculture is that it reduces the domestic currency cost of 
imported foodstuff. Since food is often imported duty free, 
domestic producers must compete with artificially cheapened foreign 
food supplies. This puts a downward pressure on domestic price, 
discouraging local production of importable food. 
B. An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Exchange Rate Over-
Valuation on Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
39. To statistically test the importance of exchange rate 
policy on agricultural growth, the analysis in Chapter III of the 
effect of farm price distortions was extended. The 31 countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa for which data is available were separated into 
two groups: those with a positive real rate of currency depreciation 
during 1970-81, and those having a real rate of currency 
appreciation. Real rates of depreciation or -appreciation were 
obtained by adjusting for the rate of domestic price inflation. 
According to the reasoning of Section A above, countries whose 
currencies were depreciating should tend to have higher agricultural 
growth rates than those whose currencies were appreciating. 1/ 
1/ Data on rates of depreciation and appreciation are taken 
from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Domestic inflation 
rates were obtained from the 1983 World Bank World Development 
Report. Data sources are discussed in Annex II. It should be noted 
that the definition of real exchange rate changes used here is not 
the conventional one. The measure is the exchange rate divided by a 
domestic inflation rate. The conventional measure is the trade 
weighted change of the exchange rate adjusted for the difference 
between the domestic inflation rate and the trade weighted average 
inflation rate of trading partners. 
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Countries with a positive rate of real currency depreciation 
Country Rate of real 
currency depreciation 
(% p.a. average) 
Agricultural 
growth rate 
Chad 2.A 0.7 
Ethiopia 4.2 0.9 
Mali 0.1 4.0 
Malawi 0.3 4.1 
Upper Volta 0.3 1.4 
Benin 0.4 0.0 
Sierra Leone 0.9 2.4 
Kenya 2.0 4.2 
Senegal 1.9 2..6 
Lesotho 1.4 4.3 
Liberia 1.1 5.0 
Zambia 3.4 1.8 
Average 2.6 
Countries for which currency appreciated (negative real 
depreciation) 
Country Rate of Depreciation Agricultural Growth Rate 
Zaire -3.3 1.5 
Uganda -11.7 -0.8 
Rwanda -4.1 3.0 
Somalia -3.7 -0.6 
Tanzania -0.5 3.3 
Guinea -5.5 -0.7 
Central African 
Republic -2.8 2.3 
Madagascar -0.8 0.3 
Niger -2.4 -3.0 
Sudan -1.8 2.3 
Ghana -16.8 0.0 
Nigeria -5.6 -0.4 
Zimbabwe -0.4 -0.5 
Cameroon -0.8 3.9 
Botswana -0.1 8.5 
Congo -2.1 2.1 
Ivory Coast -3.2 4.7 
Average 1.5 
(Average excluding 
Botswana) (1.1) 
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40. The hypothesis appears correct. Countries whose currencies 
appreciated had lower agricultural growth than those whose 
currencies depreciated. Statistical analysis suggests that the rate 
of currency depreciation has a slightly greater impact on 
agricultural growth than does farm price distortions. If the rate 
of currency depreciation is substituted for the degree of farm price 
distortion in the equation reported in para 25, the following 
results: 
Agricul- =-1.8 + .15 Rate of +.11 % of +1.0 Population 
tural Depre- Public Growth 
Growth elation Expendi-
ture in 
GDP 
-1.5 Public 
Involve-
ment in 
Input 
Supply 
T Stat = (1.0X1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (2.3) 
R 2 = .34 F(4,26) = 4.79 
All variables are significant at the 90% level or above except the 
constant term. A 1% p.a. increase in the rate of currency depreciation 
is associated with a .15% increase in agricultural growth. The common 
assertion that over-valued exchange rates have a negative impact on 
agricultural growth appears to be correct. However, as In the case of 
nominal protection, the exchange rate regime explains little of the 
variation observed in agricultural growth. 
41. Because the rate of currency depreciation and the degree of 
farm price distortion are related (the latter incorporates to some 
extent the former), both cannot be included as independent variables in 
the same equation. Their relationship is expressed in the following: 
Nominal 
Protection 
Coefficient 
= 72.6 + 1.2 Rate of 
Deprecia-
tion 
T Stat = _ (2.2) (1.4) 
R 2 = .04 
The higher the rate of depreciation the higher the nominal protection 
coefficient (i.e. the lower the policy discrimination against farmer 
prices). 
42. The conclusion is that currency over-valuation does agriculture 
no good. Currency depreciation will have a significant, but not very 
large impact on agricultural growth. 
C. The Argument for Intentionally Discriminating against 
Agriculture using Exchange Rate Policy and Import Duties/ 
Controls 
43. There Is an argument that discrimination against agriculture 
such as that obtained by an over-valued exchange rate might be in the 
interest of some countries, because it is the inevitable consequence of 
an industry led growth strategy. This line of reasoning is as follows. 
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World prices of agricultural commodities are volatile, and are falling 
over the long-term. Long-term dependancy on agricultural exports is 
therefore risky at best. Perhaps In the past agriculture had some 
comparative advantage and industry received excessive attention. But 
long-term dynamic comparative advantage suggests that export agriculture 
be de-emphasized. Presently, world prices are at a cyclical low. and it 
may be the time to diversify quickly out of such sectors into industry 
and into production of food crops for the domestic market. The policy 
package described as typical in para 8 above can be construed as 
pursuing this strategy. Export taxes and an over-valued exchange rate 
discourage agricultural exports and agricultural growth, but encourage 
some domestic food production. Diversification into protected industry 
is also promoted. What is the validity of this argument? 
44. - In analyzing the argument the first question involves the 
future trends of international prices for agricultural commodities. 
World Bank international commodity price projections are presented below: 
Quarterly Average Price (World Market) 1/ 
Projected % Price 
Average Average Average Projected Increase in 
1977 2/ 1981 1982 1983 1990 constant 1981 
Prices from 1983 
to 1990 3/ 
...(current US $). 
Cocoa tf kg 3.79 2.08 1.74 2.12 2.26 - 54 
Coffee t» 5.17 2.82 3.09 2.90 4.14 - 15 
Tea it 2.69 2.02 1.93 2.30 2.87 - 32 
Beef it 1.51 2.48 2.39 2.45 3.90 - 3 
Cotton »» 1.62 1.87 1.61 1.87 3.22 5 
Rubber tt 0.92 1.25 1.01 1.24 2.26 11 
Rice $/ton 272.00 483.00 293.00 279.00 663.00 45 
Maize it 95.00 131.00 109.00 136.00 222.00 0 
Wheat it 116.00 196.00 167.00 170.00 297.00 6 
Palm Oil tf 530.00 571.00 445.00 502.00 909.00 10 
Sugar if 179.00 374.00 186.00 187.00 372.00 89 
Bananas tt 275.00 401.00 374.00 430.00 509.00 - 39 
Logs (Ln) $/cm 90.00 145.00 145.00 140.00 258.00 11 
17 World Bank Half Yearly Revisions of Commodity Price Forecasts, 
January 16, 1984 and World Bank "Price Prospects for major primary 
commodities", July 1982. 
2/ Year in which most primary commodity prices peaked. 
3/ This percentage equals the projected price of the commodity in 1990 
deflated to 1981 prices with an international commodity price index, 
compared to the average price In 1983, deflated to 1981 constant prices. 
This measures the percentage "real" price change expected in 1990. 
Source: World Bank, "Half Yearly Revisions of Commodity Price 
Forecasts", January 16, 1984. 
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45. Prices for nearly all commodities have declined or stagnated on 
world markets since 1981. More detailed data show that the decline began 
in 1978/79. Some*commodity prices began to improve in late 1982 and 
early 1983. However, average world prices were also increasing so in 
"real" terms the improvement has been less. The last column shows price 
projections from 1983-1990, in constant 1981 prices (i.e. deflated to 
1981 with the World Bank's international commodity price index). 
(a) Five of the agricultural commodities shown in the table are 
projected to have continued declines in world price (computed in 
constant 1981 dollars): cocoa, coffee, tea, bananas, and beef. 
Maize prices are expected to stagnate in real terms. 
(b) Seven of the commodities are projected to have increased world 
prices (in constant 1981 dollars). Cotton and wheat prices will 
increase in real terms, but at a relatively low rate. Prices of 
palm oil and rice are projected to increase rapidly in real 
terms. However, to a large extent, these rapid real price 
increases are the result of the low base on which the percentage 
increases are computed (the world prices of these commodities 
were at extremely low levels in 1983). Other commodities are 
projected to have moderate gains in world prices. 
46. The above projections suggest considerable variation in price 
performance between commodities, making generalizations difficult. The 
extremely low level of international prices for most agricultural 
products in the last several years has been a temporary phenomenon for 
some, permanent for others. The premise of the argument in para 43 
appears too general: the long-term trend of world agricultural prices is 
downward for only some commodities. Countries dependent on exports of 
the commodities for which projections are poor should diversify if there 
is something to diversify into. Even for these products, production 
should be reduced only if cropland is scarce and other higher value crops 
can be substituted. Nevertheless, the above projections do suggest that 
improved agricultural price and exchange rate policy may be at least 
partly offset in some countries by declining world agricultural prices. 
47. The second part of the argument in para 43 is that in many 
African countries, export and import substituting agriculture has no 
comparative advantage. This is not true according to most studies. In 
nearly every Sub-Saharan African country, agriculture and agro-industry 
have comparative advantage over most other sectors in contributing to 
economic development. Agriculture uses relatively abundant resources 
(land, rainfall/water, sun, unskilled labor, locally manufactured tools 
and equipment) which are relatively cheap to these countries, although it 
also uses some scarce resources such as fertilizer, to produce essential 
products for consumption and/or for export. Many non-agricultural import 
substituting industries require more costly and scarce inputs (skilled 
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labor, imported inputs) to produce often less essential industrial goods 
(often consumed by middle and upper classes). Therefore a price and 
exchange rate policy which discriminates against agriculture and promotes 
import substituting industry is a strategy which makes less use of local 
resources in most African countries. It is a costly strategy 1/. 
48. Findings of several studies (such as the World Bank's 1982 World 
Development Report) suggest that high economic growth is associated with 
high agricultural and/or high export growth (in developing countries 
other than oil exporters). An IMF study of the impact of exchange rate 
changes in eleven African countries found the same degree of agricultural 
importance 2/. The data from the 31 Sub-Saharan countries referred to 
above shows a very high correlation between agricultural growth and 
overall economic growth (.56 correlation coefficient). 
49. Because of the arguments developed in paras 44-48 above, most of 
the literature prescribes an exchange rate devaluation, reform of the 
trade regime, and price policy reform. These reforms would make export 
and Import substituting activities more profitable, encouragc economic 
diversification and in most cases encourage agriculture. The devaluation 
must come with fiscal and monetary policies designed to keep domestic 
price inflation no higher than International price inflaction. Terms of 
trade it is argued will shift in favor of agriculture (and exports), and 
against import substituting industry. Those industries like agriculture 
and agro-industry with greater comparative advantage will expand, those 
which exist only due to protection will disappear. The analysis above 
supports the direction of these arguments. The problem is in the speed 
and magnitude of the changes. If agriculture is slow to respond 
positively to the policy reform, while the manufacturing sector contracts 
rapidly, then the dislocation in the short term can be substantial. If 
added to this is a tendency for the world prices of principal 
agricultural exports to decline, the benefits to agriculture of the price 
policy reform may be offset, at least in part, by movements in world 
prices. This makes the short term dislocation even worse. This may 
explain why such policy reform is so difficult to sustain in Africa. 
This argument should not be construed as supporting continued sub-optimal 
price and exchange rate policy. It does have implications for the way in 
which reform is pursued. 
1/ For evidence see studies 4, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17, 21, 26, 27, 33, 
37, 38, 42, and 44. 
2/ Source 41. 
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V. TOWARD AN APPROPRIATE PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY 
A. Summary of the Impact of Typical Price and Exchange Rate 
Policy on Agriculture 
50. In summary, the work reported in this article finds that 
the direction and type of impact on African agriculture of the 
typical policy package described in paragraph 8 is similar to that 
described in the literature (see bibliography). To look at this 
further, the conventional wisdom is set out in summary form below. 
(a) Low retail prices for some food staples stimulate the 
consumption of those staples, over time replacing 
consumption of non-subsidized staples. Non-subsidized 
staples are "crowded out" in urban areas (typically wheat 
and maize flour, and rice crowd out cassava, millet and 
sorghum). The urban poor benefit somewhat, the urban 
middle class benefit a great deal, and the rural population 
is hurt. 
(b) A combination of low producer prices and Government 
subsidies of parastatals, required to maintain low retail 
food prices, causes agricultural production, investment and 
growth to decline. Subsidies to parastatals reduce the 
resources available for development expenditure. Greater 
dependency on food imports results. 1/ 
(c) Over-valued exchange rates combined with duties on 
agricultural exports reduce production of agricultural 
products, or if supported by Government financed 
parastatals, requires Government subsidy to maintain. In 
the latter case, resources available for development 
expenditures are reduced because of the subsidies. An 
over-valued exchange rate also encourages food imports, 
discouraging production of import substitutes unless 
tariffs are established to protect domestic production (as 
is often done for industry but rarely for agriculture). 
(d) Policy discrimination against agriculture reduces 
agricultural growth. This makes a country less 
self-sufficient in food, and reduces economic growth. The 
short-term industrial expansion typically resulting from 
such policy has not compensated for the decline in 
agriculture. Income distribution becomes more negatively 
skewed since industry employs only a few while agriculture 
is a potential large employer. Income Is also distributed 
to cities and out of the countryside. Rural-urban 
migration is exacerbated. 
1/ Commercial cereal imports into Africa increased at 9% p.a. 
during the 20 year period 1961-1982 (World Bank data). 
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(e) Social/Political stability and the meeting of minimum 
nutritional needs may be served in the short-term but in 
the long-term the slowing of economic growth and the 
skewing of income distribution away from the rural 
population (and in favor of a small industrial elite) will 
increase social/political instability. The resource base 
from which the nutritional needs of the poor is met will 
shrink as economies stagnate. 
B. The Appropriate Policy Reform 
51. The conventional wisdom advocates a general policy package 
to address the above problems. This package, distilled from the 
literature, is set out below. 
52. ' Producer prices for non-exported agricultural products 
should be left free where there is no domestic marketing monopoly or 
oligopoly. At most, indicative prices'might be established to 
"assist the market-place in setting prices. Official prices would be 
negotiated for official transactions. Where there is a significant 
marketing monopoly or oligopoly (either public or private), producer 
prices should be fixed by Government high enough to stimulate 
production, savings and investment in agriculture. Typically such 
prices should be at long-term world price levels for similar 
products (adjusted for internal handling and transport costs). This 
can be assisted by allowing private marketing enterprises to compete 
with parastatals, removing administrative barriers to agricultural 
trade, and providing assistance (credit, market information, 
necessary infrastructure such as roads) to help private traders. 
53. Producer prices for exportables should be free to move in 
response to world markets. If administratively feasible, there is 
an argument for supporting producer prices of exportables against 
short-term world market instability through stabilization funds. 
Prices should be set to match long-term average world prices. 
However, when world prices are above the long-term average, 
stabilization funds should be permitted to accumulate reserves. 
54. Taxes on agricultural exports should be minimized. 
55. In the long-term, income taxes (or expenditure or value 
added taxes) should replace import and export duties as major 
revenue sources. Import duties should be as uniform as possible 
(uniform non-discriminatory rates). Land taxes should be imposed 
where feasible. 
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56. Exchange rates should be managed to assure purchasing power 
parity of the local currency with that of major trading partners. 
This will require' frequent change in exchange rates since major 
currencies are now floating which means that most country's 
currencies are appreciating or depreciating in part independently of 
internal events or policy objectives. (Currencies pegged to the 
dollar have appreciated during the last three years, those pegged to 
the French franc have depreciated). An alternative to managed rates 
which may be more practical for some countries is to allow the 
exchange rate to float. 
57. In the franc zone, where exchange rates cannot be managed, 
Governments should pursue fiscal policy and credit expansion at a 
rate which will not cause domestic price inflation to exceed price 
inflation in France (and increasingly other trading partners). 
Where exchange rates are over-valued in franc zone countries because 
domestic price inflation exceeds international inflation, a second 
best solution should be considered in which subsidies are provided 
to exports and duties on imports to offset the effect of 
over-valuation. Compensatory subsidies on primary goods exports may 
however have to be limited because of Government fiscal constraints. 
58. Farm input subsidies should be provided only for short 
periods to assist in introducing new inputs. Input subsidies should 
be otherwise phased out. Governments should pursue recovery of 
costs of services. 
59. Consumer food subsidies should be removed. In their place 
should be limited direct food transfers to the truly needy in urban 
areas. The best strategy for assisting the poor is a maximum 
economic growth strategy, with interventions designed to distribute 
the benefits of growth over the maximum number of people. 
C. The Conventional Wisdom regarding the likely Impact of 
the Proposed Reform 
60. The literature suggests that the recommended policy package 
should in the medium- and long-term do the following. 
61. Domestic and export agricultural production would be 
stimulated in proportions reflecting the country's comparative 
advantage (and hence depending on the magnitude of supply 
elasticities). Comparative advantage would change over time, and 
development expenditures must be planned and directed to take 
advantage of new possibilities and new sources of growth. 
I 
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62. By reducing Government outlays on consumer subsidies, 
parastatal subsidies and farm input subsidies, more will be 
available for development expenditure. Increased development 
expenditure (both for operation and maintenance of existing 
investments, and for new investment) can be directed to agricultural 
and economic diversification and long-term development according to 
an analysis of dynamic comparative advantage. Some of the savings 
would be channelled to providing food to the truly needy and, in the 
short term, to supporting domestic prices of agricultural exports. 
Some of the savings will be lost due to reduced revenue from export 
and import duties. However, land taxes, increased expenditure taxes 
and Income taxes combined with reduced subsidies can make up for 
this. 
63. • Exports would increase and imports decline due to 
devaluation, exchange rate management, and to fiscal and monetary 
policies designed to keep the real exchange rate from appreciating 
.(and in the franc, zone due to export subsidies and import duties on 
agricultural products). 
64. Industrial production will decline in the short-run (due to 
devaluation, reduction of import barriers, greater income taxes). 
This negative impact on economic growth should be more than made up 
for by greater agricultural growth, and in the longer-term by 
greater industrial growth consistent with country comparative 
advantage (again depending on supply elasticities). The net effect 
on economic growth would be positive in the medium- and long-term. 
65. Employment would increase (agriculture uses more labor than 
industry). 
66. The rate of rural-urban migration would possibly decline 
(due to higher relative rural incomes). 
67. Food prices would increase in the short term, industrial 
goods prices would decline. Real urban income would decline, real 
rural income would increase. The urban poor would not be worse off 
due to direct food distribution. The urban middle and upper class 
would be worse off in the short- and inedium-term. This will result 
in political pressure.to reverse policies in the short-term. It is 
therefore the short-term which will be difficult and will require 
foreign aid to assist the transition. 
D. The Critique and A Recommendation 
68. The empirical analysis undertaken for this article gave 
results consistent with both the conventional wisdom regarding the 
impact of price and exchange rate discrimination against 
agriculture, and the appropriate policy response. However, the 
results suggest that the impact of the policy response summarized 
above may not be as great as much of the literature suggests. 
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The magnitude of the impact summarized in paras 61 to 67 above may 
be exaggerated. Other factors such as inefficient Government 
involvement in farm input supply and marketing, population growth, 
the effort made by Government in operating and maintaining 
agricultural investments, resource endowment, the efficiency of 
agricultural research, extension, and credit services, politics, and 
other as yet unidentified factors are of much greater importance in 
determining agricultural growth. Indeed, there is still a 
relatively large area of ignorance regarding causes of agricultural 
growth. The expansionary impact of reform on agriculture may be 
slower to work than the negative impact on the existing (protected) 
manufacturing sector. It follows that it may be deceptive to 
predict large structural changes to occur from reform of price and 
exchange rate policy, especially in the short term. 
69. The empirical analysis undertaken here also underlined the. 
tremendous variation in performance and constraints facing different 
African countries. It follows that the policy package prescribed 
should be adjusted to fit particular country circumstances. 
Variations in country objectives, resource endowments, location, 
policy distortions, etc. make it impossible to prescribe a single 
set of price and exchange rate policy reforms appropriate to all 
Sub-Saharan African countries. 
70. In addition, political constraints reduce the flexibility 
of some Governments in implementing the full range of policy changes 
represented above as the optimal package. The importance of this 
argument cannot be over-emphasized. Robert Bates in Markets and 
States in Tropical. Africa argues that the kinds of distorted price 
policy described in paragraph 8 as typical in many countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa are the result of short-term decisions made by 
political leaders on the basis of calculation about how their 
political interests are best served. 1/ The price policy reform 
packagc described above is usually seen as inconsistent with these 
political interests. This is exacerbated by the short term cost of 
reform as described above. Therefore, reforms are not implemented 
despite the quality of the technical arguments to reform and 
pressure by the IMF, World Bank and other donors. The price 
distortions described above are seen by Bates as generating 
Government controlled revenue which can be reallocated from the 
politically unimportant (farmers), to the politically important (the 
urban population receiving food subsidies, the bureaucracy including 
that in the marketing parastatals which requires revenue to maintain 
itself and grow, industrialists and their employees benefitting from 
protection etc). In some cases, some of this revenue (or rent) 2/ 
can be acquired directly by political leaders (i.e. corruption). 
These latter groups have power and influence. Farmers (particularly 
small farmers) are typically unorganized and have little power or 
influence. The groups which benefit become vested interests which 
resist reform. 
1/ Source number 10. 
2/ This concept of an administratively generated rent or value 
created by causing scarcity of a commodity or controlling its 
distribution is in Krueger's: "The Political Economy of the Rent 
Seeking Society", America Economic Review, 1974 No 3:291-303. 
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71. In some countries, price policy reform may be Impossible 
until political situations change. Again Bates finds that where the 
political elite is engaged in food production, policies tend to be 
less discriminatory against agriculture (Kenya and Ivory Coast are 
examples of this situation). 1J Such farmers tend to be large 
farmers. Large farmers are in a better position to bring pressure 
to bare on Government to reduce policy distortions which 
discriminate against agriculture. Other groupings of farmers 
(cooperatives, associations such as the Kenya Farmers' Association) 
have the same interest group effect. Similarly, agro-industry 
dependent on farmers may serve as a pressure group for policy reform 
benefitting agriculture. Without pressure from such groupings or 
from large farmers, price policy reform benefitting agriculture will 
rarely occur. It will be resisted by those vested interests 
identified above. 
72. If the above is correct, fundamental policy reform of price 
and exchange rate policy is likely to come slowly in most of Africa, 
evolving with the development of agriculture itself. As agriculture 
develops, larger more influential farmers will emerge, farmers' 
groups will develop, agro-industrial interests will in some cases 
lobby for the interests of agriculture. Institutions of development 
assistance must be aware of this situation in their advocacy of 
policy change. 
73. If one accepts the above reasoning as generally applicable 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, and combines it with the finding that the 
desirable but contentious price and exchange rate policy package 
alone will only have a relatively small and slow impact on 
agricultural production, and that we are still relatively ignorant 
about the causes of agricultural growth in Africa, then there are 
some operational conclusions which emerge. Firstly, where there is 
a political constraint to price policy reform which is impossible to 
overcome (perhaps due to the significant social and political 
instability which would result from reform), a much slower reform 
process than is usually prescribed should be pursued. In the first 
instance, other instruments affecting agricultural growth (such as 
improved research, extension, input supply, marketing and/or credit 
systems) might be established. Price policy reform might then be 
pursued as a second step. Secondly, donor institutions could 
exploit their situations as a lobby group which can indirectly help 
reform by aiding the development of farmer organizations, 
agro-business and cooperatives which lobby for reform. Donors might 
also be more neutral toward large farmers which form the backbone of 
the farmer lobby In pursuing reform. Such groups may ally 
themselves witli donors in advocating reform. Donor institutions 
will have to be more realistic in establishing reform targets. 
Compromises with the optimal package presented above will often be 
politically necessary in the short-term. An evolution of policy in 
the right direction will in itself begin the process of creating 
agricultural wealth, and in so doing creating agricultural 
1/ Bates, source number 10, page 45. 
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interests which will push for further reform. An immediately 
optimal cr near optimal package will rarely be feasibile, and in any 
case will not have the large and rapid agricultural impact generally 
expected. Donors should act in such a way as to influence policy to 
evolve in a technically desirable direction, which for price policy 
is that described in paragraphs 54-61. This suggests that the 
creation of an institutionalized process under which reform Is 
analized and pursued may be more important than achieving policy 
reform targets involving specific price or exchange rate levels. 
Prices or exchange rates can always be changed again, in the wrong 
direction. However, solidly established processes for analizing and 
implementing policy reform may have a more durable impact in the 
long term. 1/ In addition, the process of analizing may uncover 
some of the unknowns regarding agricultural growth. Thus the 
reforms pursued should be regarded as a process, rather than a 
condition to be achieved. 
1/ One minimum package possibly appropriate in difficult 
countries was suggested in a written comment by Wilfred Candler. It 
would be responsive to the political constraints, and provide a push 
in the right direction. It would include: (a) establishment of an 
institution in Government which analizes policy issues, and provides 
technical recommendations to Government (i.e technical advocacy), 
(b) dual exchange rate to apply at the margin, (c) retention by 
exporters of sufficient foreign exchange to meet their import 
requirements, (d) some improvements to producer incentives, 
Including better prices and more incentive goods, (e) creation of a 
strategic food reserve, (f) improved agricultural research and 
extension. There are other minimum packages which may be more 
appropriate depending on the country context. It is this type of 
compromise which will be required however. 
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METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING REFERENCE PRICES, 
POLICY DISTORTIONS AND COMPARATIVE"ADVANTAGE 
A. Reference Prices 
1. Long-term world prices can be used as reference prices in 
determining whether domestic prices are artificially low or high. A 
projection should be made of the world price, and this "long-term" world 
prices Is used irt order to exclude temporary world market conditions. 
The use of world prices as reference does not mean that such prices 
represent free trade, or best, prices. World prices are not free trade 
prices. They are distorted by trade barriers, the price policies of 
major supply countries, dumping, monopoly practices etc. But looked at 
from the point of view of the individual small country, world prices are 
what that country must pay for its imports or receive for its exports. 
Such prices represent opportunity costs. For example, the value t:o 
country X of producing a ton of wheat is the foreign exchange saved In 
not having to import it. This is measured at the world price. Similarly 
the value of a ton of wheat exported by country X is its likely price in 
foreign exchange 1/. For goods and services not traded internationally, 
the "opportunity cost" to the domestic economy of using that good or 
service Is its appropriate price. Appropriate exchange rates are 
generally those which would assure purchasing power parity with the 
currencies of trading partners. This is calculated by pricing comparable 
sets of commodities and services between the country for which the 
exchange rate is being computed, and trading partners. These price 
relatives are. combined with quantity weights in determining appropriate 
exchange rates. 
2. For products which are imported, the appropriate reference price 
in country X is the product's c.i.f. price delivered to country X. If 
exported by country X, the appropriate price is the product's f.o.b. 
price when exported from country X 2/. 
1? The rationale Is described in considerable detail in sources numbers 
3.1, 37 and 40. Applications of the methodology are numerous. 
Several applications are given in sources numbers 2, 4, 12, 14, 18, 
19, 26, 29, and 30. 
2/ If however country X's increased demand for an import would affect 
the international price for the commodity, and if world supply ana 
demand for the commodity are not perfectly elastic, the reference 
price should equal the marginal import cost. A similar proposition 
holds for exports (use marginal export revenue). For imports this 
may be estimated as the c.i.f. price multiplied by (1 + 1/e) where 
(e) is; the elasticity of foreign, supply. Marginal export revenue is 
measured as the f.o.b. export price multiplied by (1 = 1/x) where (x) 
is the elasticity of foreign demand. 
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3. The opportunity cost of labor in a particular use is measured as 
the value of production foregone elsewhere in the economy as a result of 
employing the laborer in that use. This can be measured as the weighted 
average of the marginal productivity of labor in agriculture, in 
industry, in Government, and among the unemployed. 
4. The opportunity cost of capital is the rate of return on the 
marginal investment in the economy. One can distinguish between the 
opportunity cost of Government and of private sector investment, or of 
investment in other sectors. 
5. Goods which are not traded on world markets are broken down into 
their cost of production. Inputs used to produce these non-traded goods 
are valued at world prices. Labor, capital and land inputs are valued at 
opportunity cost. The resulting total cost of production of a non-traded 
good at world prices and opportunity is taken to be its value. 
B. Measuring Policy Distortions 
6. The most common measure of the impact of policy on value added 
is the effective protection coefficient. Value added is the value of 
output less the value of purchased Inputs, less depreciation. The sum of 
value added in an economy equals GDP. Effective protection measures the 
percentage increase in the value added of an industry (or enterprise or 
sector) which results from price/tax/subsidy/exchange rate policy. 
Specifically it equals value added in domestic prices divided by value 
added measured in border prices and at a purchasing power exchange 
rate 1/. If effective protection exceeds 1, then policy provides a 
positive incentive to produce the commodity (or invest in the industry or 
sector). This is because value added is being increased by policy over 
what it would have been had prices been defined by the world market. If 
effective protection is less than 1, policy discriminates against the 
commodity (i.e. domestic value added is less than it would have been had 
world prices been applicable). The analysis in Chapter IV D of farm 
level price distortions, measured distortion as the average rates of 
farmgate prices to world prices adjusted for internal handling. This is 
called the nominal protection coefficient. 
1/ Interesting examples of effective protection analysis are given in 
source numbers 4, 14, 15, 19, 22, 26, 37. 
IDS/DP 279 
ANNEX I 
Page 3 
C. Measuring Comparative Advantage 
7. The measurement of comparative advantage is similar to the 
measurement of the economic viability of a project. Each measures the 
net value of a specific production line, investment, project, etc. to an 
economy, relative to other possible production lines, investments or 
projects. In investment and project analysis, nearly universal use is 
now made of an economic rate of return to measure economic impact. This 
is the rate of return on a stream of net benefits generated by an 
investment (or project) which are measured as: 
benefits : value of production in world prices 
costs : cost of inputs valued in world prices 
for tradables, opportunity costs for 
non-tradables. 
foreign exchange : is valued in local currency at a 
purchasing power parity exchange rate. 
The resulting economic rate of return is compared to the opportunity 
costs of capital in the country (i.e. the likely return if the investment 
was made in the most likely alternative activity). If the rate of return 
exceeds the opportunity cost of capital, the investment or project is 
judged economically A'iable. The measurement of comparative advantage 
can be similarly undertaken. Those activities (sectors, industries) 
which contribute most to an economy (having the highest rate of return) 
are those in which that economy's comparative advantage lies. Industries 
with economic advantage have an economic rate of return investments 
higher than the opportunity cost of capital 
8. To obtain an idea of the structure of comparative advantage in 
an economy, economic rates of return to investments in various industries 
can be compared. Another method frequently used is to analyze the net 
economic benefit per unit of output of various industries in a single 
year for which an economic census exists. This shows value added per 
unit of output in world prices and opportunity costs. Industries having 
the highest value added per unit of output contribute most to the 
economy. To obtain an idea of future or dynamic comparative advantage, 
this same calculation is undertaken substituting projected world prices, 
opportunity costs, and physical costs. 
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9. Another common short-measure of comparative advantage is the 
domestic resource cost coefficient. It is an arithmetic derivative of 
the economic rate of return and net economic benefit coefficients. It is 
measured as the ratio between the opportunity cost of domestic resources 
used in production (by an enterprise, an industry or project), divided by 
net foreign exchange earnings or savings created by the enterprise 
measured in world prices. This ratio can be interpreted as the domestic 
cost of a dollar earned or saved through domestic production. This ratio 
computed for any enterprise (industry of project), can be compared to a 
purchasing power parity exchange rate. If the cost of domestic resources 
used to produce a dollar in net foreign exchange earnings or savings is 
greater for an enterprise (industry or sector) than the value of foreign 
exchange in terms of domestic currency defined by the purchasing power 
parity exchange rate, then the enterprise (industry of project) is not 
viable. It has no comparative advantage 1/. 
1/ This kind of analysis is undertaken in sources numbers 15, 18, 
19, 17, 18, 22, 26, 29 and 37.. 
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DATA 
1. The attached tables show the following data for 31 countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
(a) Agricultural Growth Rates, 1970-81. The source is the World 
Bank Development Report 1983 (Source 44), except for Tanzania (Source 
43), Guinea (Source 43), Chad, Malawi, Benin, Lesotho, Liberia, Botswana 
(Source 43). 
(b) Rate of Currency Depreciation, .1.970-81. This measure is the 
percentage annual rate of currency depreciation (appreciation is 
represented by a minus), minus the annual rate of price inflation. Data 
on depreciation is taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics, 
except for Guinea where the.source is number 43. Price inflation data is 
from source 44. 
(c) The rate of increase of public consumption (1970-81): Source 
44, except Chad, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana, and Guinea (Source 
42 and 43). 
(d) The percentage of Government consumption in GDP (1981) 
(Source 44), except Chad, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan, Lesotho, Botswana 
(Source 42). 
(e) Annual growth in barter terms of trade (1970-79) (Source 
42), Guinea (Source 43), Lesotho and Botswana (Bank estimates). 
(f) Adult literacy rate (1980) (Source 44). 
(g) Population growth rate (1970-8.1) (Source 44). 
(h) Percent share in exports of three principal exports 
(1976-78) (Source 44). 
(i) Supply of fertilizers, seed, chemicals and equipment by 
Government (Sources 41, 44). 
2. Farm Level Price Distortions. This was measured as the average 
coefficient of farmgate price to world price adjusted to the farmgate. 
Data sources are 1, 13, 21, 22, 28, 43, 44, 45. This data distills an 
extremely large number of studies and measurements. The measure has some 
margin of error for the following reasons: 
(a) for most countries,, the degree of price distortion has 
varied during the 1970-81 period. This variation cannot be 
captured in a single coefficient. Coefficients dating from the 
raid-seventies were used, or averages over a series of years for 
which data is available; 
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(b) for some countries price data is sparse (for others it is 
rich); 
(c) there is considerable variation in price distortions between 
commodities in the same country. The average figure averages 
these out, but the variation between commodities is also 
important; 
(d) data or average internal handling costs is usually 
inaccurate; 
(e) in many studies of domestic price/world price comparison, 
adjustment of world price for exchange rate over-valuation is 
not done. This distorts the coefficients (which should account 
for over-valuation of local currency); 
(f) the importance of the parallel market on which official 
prices have a limited impact is in most countries impossible to 
measure. This affects the degree of aggregate price 
distortions. Usually, there is little or no price distortion on 
such markets. To the extent that these markets are very 
important, price distortions decline. This is why in Zambia for 
example where official prices have been very distorted, the 
aggregate price distortion is only medium. Much is traded on 
the unofficial market. 
3. The measurement of price distortion would be improved if net 
effective protection were used, which accounts for input price 
distortions. 
4. Despite the measurement problem, the measurement of farm price 
distortions was statistically related to agricultural growth. This 
suggests that the measurement does not merely consist of random numbers. 
Secondly, if the measure were more accurate, the statistical relationship 
with agricultural growth would be even stronger. 
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COUNTRY AGGROW DEPREC PUBCGR BARTOT NPC 
Chad .7 2.4 -1.7 1.6 1 
Ethiopia .9 4.2 3.4 2.4 .5 
Mali 4 .1 7.3 -.6 .8 
Malawi 4.1 .3 2.2 -.5 1 
Zaire 1.5 -3.3 -.2 -7.8 .5 
Uganda -.8 -11.7 -.9 3.1 .5 
Burundi 2.2 -1.3 3.1 -.9 .8 
Upper Volta 1.4 .3 7.1 -1.3 1 
Rwanda 3 -4.1 11.8 6.3 .9 
Somalia -.6 -3.7 11.7 -2.7 .9 
Tanzania 3.3 -.5 6.5 .7 .7 
Guinea -.7 -5.5 4.5 -.6 .3 
Benin 0 .4 2.4 -2.8 .6 
Central African 
Republic 2.3 -2.8 -2.9 1.3 1 
Sierra Leone 2.4 .9 -1:9 -1.6 .5 
.Madagascar 3 -.8 1.3 -.9 .6 
Niger -3 -2.4 2.6 -2.2 .8 
Sudan 2.3 -1.8 6.9 1.4 .75 
Togo 1.5 .9 9.9 9 .5 
Ghana 0 -16.8 4.7 6.9 .6 
Kenya 4.2 2 9.2 2.2 .9 
Senegal 2.6 1.9 5.9 1.4 .7 
Lesotho 4.3 1.4 15.4 0 .9 
Liberia 5 1.1 2.2 -4.1 .8 
Zambia 1.8 3.4 .8 -9 .7 
Nigeria -.4 -5.6 11 17.2 .7 
Zimbabwe -.5 -.4 9.7 0 1 
Cameroon 3.9 -.8 3 6.1 .85 
Botswana 8.5 -.1 16.9 0 1 
Congo 2.1 -2 2.3 1 .85 
Ivory Coast 4.7 -3.2 10.1 3 .85 
AGGROW: Agricultural Growth Rate p.a. 1970-81 
DEPREC: Rate of real currency depreciation 1970-81 (a - sign signifies real 
appreciation) : (% p.a.) 
PURCGR: Growth rate p.a. of public consumption 1970-81 (% p.a.) 
BARTOT: Annual change in barter terms of trade 1970-79 (% p.a.) 
NPC : Nominal Protection Coefficient: average 1970-81 
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COUNTRY FERT POPGR LITCY INFL PUB% 
Chad 3 2 15 7.4 18 
Ethiopia 40 2 15 4.1 15 
Mali 60 2.6 10 9.7 26 
Malawi 141 3 25 10.3 10 
Zaire 13 3 55 35.3 16 
Uganda 1 2.6 52 41.2 4 
Burundi 8 2.2 25 11.6 16 
Upper Volta 40 2 5 9.5 15 
Rwanda 1 3.4 50 13.4 17 
Somalia 23 2.8 60 12.6 19 
Tanzania 69 3.4 79 11.9 14 
* Guinea 2 2.9 20 4.6 19 
Benin 17- 2.7 28 9.4 13 
Central African 
Republic 5 2.3 33 12.6 13 
Sierra Leone 10 2.6 15 12.2 11 
Madagascar 29 2.6 50 10.6 16 
Niger 8 3.3 10 12.2 9 
Sudan 65 3.1 32 15.9 11 
Togo 30 2.5 18 8.9 17 
Ghana 43 3 36.4 11 
Kenya 262 4 47 10.2 21 
Senegal 36 2.7 10 7.9 22 
Lesotho 154 2.4 52 10.5 26 
Liberia 92 3.5 25 8.9 21 
Zambia 157 3.1 44 8.4 28 
Nigeria 57 2.5 34 14.2 12 
Zimbabwe 655 3.2 69 10.1 18 
Cameroon 51 2.2 10.6 7 
<• Botswana 0 3.6 35 11.6 25 1 Congo 8 2.9 11.8 12 
Ivory Coast 137 5 35 13 18 
FERT : Fertilizer consumption per ha arable land 1980 (kg/hg) 
POPGR: Average annual rate of population growth 1970-81 
LITCY: Adult literacy rate in 1980 (%) 
INFL : Annual rate of price inflation (1970-81) (% p.a.) 
PUB% : Public consumption to GDP (%) In 1981 
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COUNTRY XCONCTR GDPGROW PUBSUPI 
Chad 82 .5 1 
Ethiopia 82 O o L • 1 
Mali 56 4.6 1 
Malawi 83 5.6 0 
Zaire 91 -.2 0 
Uganda 96 -1.6 0 
Burundi 95 3.2 0 
Upper Volta 44 3.6 0 
Rwanda 87 5.3 1 
Somalia 91 3.9 1 
Tanzania 55 5.1 1 
Guinea 73 3 1 
Benin 32 . 3.3 1 
Central African 
Republic 54 1.6 0 
Sierra Leone 79 1.9 1 
Madagascar 48 .3 0 
Niger 80 3.1 1 
Sudan 71 4.1 0 
Togo 81 3.2 1 
Ghana 63 -.2 1 
Kenya 53 5.8 0 
Senegal 50 2 1 
Lesotho 100 8.4 0 
Liberia 82 1.3 0 
Zambia 96 .4 1 
Nigeria 97 4.5 0 
Zimbabwe 22 1.8 0 
Cameroon 63 6.3 0 
Botswana 99 6 0 
Congo 82 5.1 1 
Ivory Coast 68 6.2 0 
XCONCTR: % shares in exports of three principal exports 1976—78 
GDPGROW: Annual growth of GDP 1970-81 (% p.a.) 
PUBSUPI: Supply of fertilizer, seed, chemicals, equipment predominantly 
Government (1) or private/mixed (0) 
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